Based on an original data set of elections in Africa, this article addresses the orthodoxy of theoretical hypotheses regarding the effects of electoral systems. While Africanists assume that context make a significant difference, the empirical analysis points to very similar effects of electoral institutions in Africa as in established democracies; regarding reductive effects, effects on the party system, governing capacity, competition and fairness of elections. Only the logic of accountability diverges from the theories of constitutional design. In addition, the empirical analysis seems to refute Sartori's argument that party systems must be structured before electoral systems can mature. Rather, the analysis of these emerging democracies suggests that electoral systems play a role in structuring party systems.
Introduction
Africa's (re)-entry into democratic politics presents a challenge to students of African politics, although systematic comparative accounts of democratization processes are still rare. The contributions by Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and Nohlen et al.'s (1999) voluminous reviewing of elections in Africa remain the primary authorities on comparative African politics. One of the understudied areas -despite its focal interest in comparative politics -is the study of electoral systems. A few recent contributions deserve to be mentioned. Reynolds and Sisk's (1998) analysis of the potential of electoral systems for conflict management in Africa, Bogaards' (2000) www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud discussion of the consequences of electoral laws, as well as Horowitz (1991) work on constitutional recommendations for divided societies, and Foweraker and Landmann (2002) study of the effects of electoral systems on democratic performance are especially insightful. Barkan's (1998) study stands out as the only one of its kind on agrarian societies that has sought to develop and challenge theoretical insights in the field of comparative politics based in Africa.
This article seeks to both synthesize earlier efforts and deepen the analysis while testing established hypothesis against empirical evidence gathered between 1989 and 2001. From the characterization of electoral systems as portrayed in the literature, five expected consequences of electoral systems follow (here presented in a simplified manner leaving aside the various conditions of each hypothesis).
1. Majoritarian systems have a stronger reductive effect on the number of parties competing for and attaining seats in parliamentary elections, than do PR systems. 2. Majoritarian, and in particular plurality systems, produce or sustain bi-party systems whereas PR systems are associated with multi-party systems. 3. Majoritarian systems create substantial legislative majorities providing a higher governing capacity than do PR systems. 4. Majoritarian systems sustain lower levels of popular participation than do PR systems. 5. Majoritarian systems provide clearer accountability for voters than do PR systems.
African realties have sometimes challenged assumptions about the applicability of transferring and mapping of outside models onto African politics. Yet, established concepts and causal inferences generated by the study of electoral systems in established democracies remains the best way of gleaning useful insights into what actually is, as well as offering understanding to deviant situations in Africa. Nohlen (1996) , for example finds that electoral systems outcomes in Latin America largely resemble those in other parts of the world. It is an important task to demonstrate the diversity of experience on the African continent as well as to confirm the relevance of including African data in the comparative study of electoral systems.
The first section of this article briefly discusses the core characteristics and implications of the majoritarian and the proportional electoral systems, followed by an empirical analysis based on a data set of African elections collected from 1989 to 2001 to examine five classical issues: -reductive effects, effects on the party system, governing capacity, participation, and accountability. In addition, the implications of electoral systems on the fairness of elections on new and fragile democracies are analyzed. The third and final section concludes on the main findings in the wider context of comparative politics.
The orthodoxy of institutional design
Competitive elections are the hallmark of modern representative democracy. Whereas students of democracy differ on the relative importance they ascribe to elections in defining the concept, no one seems to denounce them as an unimportant. Being the largest peacetime mobilization in which a large proportion of the citizenry participate in selecting and removing political representatives, it provides a primary source of democratic legitimacy (cf. Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002) . Di Palma's (1990) truism 'to democratize is to craft institutions' has often been referred to, yet, institutional reform and engineering remains a neglected area in the study of democratization processes.
While it is selfevident that differences in socio-cultural and political differences across countries and continents must be recognized, it is equally important to pay attention to issues of constitutional choice. Especially during the processes of democratization since ''.one must recognize that electoral system reform is perceived as a key, or perhaps the key, to reforming the political system'' (Nohlen, 1996, p. 44) . Electoral rules define, among other things, the electoral formula, district magnitudes, district boundaries, assembly size, suffrage rights, rules of representation, electoral calendar, voter, party and candidate eligibility and registration, election observation, resource endowments of parties and candidates, methods of counting, tabulating and reporting of votes, election management bodies and dispute settlement authorities (cf. Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002; Sartori, 1997) . What is usually referred to as 'electoral systems' regards the rules concerning both voting method and the method used in translation of votes into seats in the representative body (Sartori, 2001, p. 99) .
Hence, electoral systems are a system of rules, which in essence make an institution (March and Olsen, 1989) . Institutions delimit political behavior and are often regarded as a powerful variable in explaining government performance. Institutions rarely, if ever, operate in a vacuum; rather, they are best conceptualized as 'embedded' (Grofman et al., 1999; Przeworski and Teune, 1970) . At a minimum, this is a cautionary note that electoral systems are not the only factors influencing outcomes; path-dependencies might mitigate against expected effects of electoral systems; and socio, political, cultural, and economic conditions may condition outcomes in significant ways (Nohlen, 1996, p. 45) . Even in carefully designed crossnational studies, direction of causality is often difficult to establish (e.g. Foweraker and Landmann, 2002) . Even so, the extension of the law-like consequences of electoral systems first developed by Duverger (1954) and Downs (1957) have been testified by the work of scholars like Bogdanor and Butler (1983) , Lijphart (1984 Lijphart ( , 1994 Lijphart ( , 1999 , Lijphart and Waisman (1996) , Mair (1990) , Powell (1982 Powell ( , 2000 , Rae (1971) , Reynolds and Sisk (1998 ), and Sartori (1968 , 1997 .
Despite the almost complete consensus among scholars that institutions like electoral systems matter because they structure incentives, preferences and outcomes, there are very few studies on the effects of distinct choices in constitutional design in new democracies. 'Consolidologists' tend to agree that consolidation of democracy involves central political institutions alongside elite behavior and mass attitudes (e.g. Diamond, 1999; Gu¨nther et al., 1995; Linz and Stepan, 1996; O'Donnell, 1996; Schedler, 1998 Schedler, , 2001 Valenzuela, 1992) . Yet, few seem to ask: Does it matter what types of institutions are put in place? Are majoritarian, mixed or proportional electoral representations doing better or worse? What are the effects of the constitutional design on party systems, governing capacity, political competition and the quality of elections in new democracies? These are the theoretical issues this article seeks to address by looking at empirical data from Africa. To date, no such crossnational study of Africa has been done.
An empirical analysis of the applicability of these findings to African requires first, identification of the distinct characteristics of each of the electoral systems at a sufficiently a high level of precision and in a way that makes theoretical sense to their conceptualization as reciprocally exclusionary categories. Second, the proposed consequences of each system must be put in operational terms. In other words, the empirical implications of each proposed effect must not only be falsifiable but also mutually exclusive.
Majoritarian electoral systems
There are two main versions of the majoritarian system: single -member plurality and absolute majority. The first is the more typical in terms of anticipated effects. Regardless, the imperative of the majoritarian vision is governing capacity, or in other words, the creation of stable legislative majorities. The translation of votes-to-seats is typically highly disproportional through the winner-takes-all in single-member constituencies. It is designated to have a strong reductive effect on the number of parties competing for legislative seats and the number of parties in parliament. Ideally, it leads to a de facto biparty system with intense competition but clear legislative majorities, hence high governing capacity and one party executives. Electoral competition will typically focus on the median voter with a tendency to exclude extremist political supporters and peripheral voting populations. (Lijphart, 1984 (Lijphart, , 1999 Reynolds and Sisk, 1998, p. 23; Powell, 2000, pp. 22-23; Weaver, 2002, p. 112) The possible dangers of majoritarian systems are predominantly in relation to divided societies where disproportionality is thought to engender alienation through exclusion from power by minorities; a high portion of wasted votes. Hence, lower incentives for participation, fewer women representatives (Lijphart, 1984 (Lijphart, , 1999 ; raise the stakes in the game by it's winner-takes-all nature, and further clientistic voting behavior through the close personal relationship between voter and representative in single-member districts (e.g. Reynolds and Sisk, 1998, p. 24) . This is in essence what is often referred to as adversarial, as opposed to consensual politics. The current literature has very little to say on the fairness of elections. Yet, it follows from the winner-takes-all of majoritarian systems that the stakes are higher, hence the incentive for using irregular practices to win is stronger than in proportional systems. For political leaders in new democracies with a half-hearted commitment to democracy at best, such incentives are likely to present a stronger temptation than to leaders in established democracies. It seems reasonable to assume that the stronger the incentives for cheating, the stronger the guardians of fairness and sanctions against fraud must be.
Proportional systems
Proportional representation (PR) systems differ in their degree of proportionality in the translation from votes to seats. Generally, the higher the district magnitude and the lower the effective threshold, the greater its proportionality. Yet, countries with smaller district magnitudes sometimes have compensatory seats for allocation to improve representation. A few countries in Africa also have reserved seats for different minorities and for women to ensure that all portions of the population are represented.
The overall imperative of the proportional vision, is representative justice. It is not however as Sartori (2001) argues, that the PR system have no reductive effect. The proportional design lessens the reductive effect although it is always present somewhat. The numbers of parties competing for votes and winning legislative seats are typically greater than in majoritarian systems. Orthodoxy has it that there is a trade off between representative justice and governing capacity. PR systems are thought to lead to legislative-executive deadlocks in presidential systems and shortlived unstable coalition governments in parliamentary systems hence lower governing capacity. The level of competition can be high or low depending on the number and relative strength of the parties, yet, typically the relative votes -and seats shares of the parties tend to be lower than in majoritarian systems (Sartori, 1997, pp. 54-55) . Again the literature is almost completely silent on the issue of the possible effects on the democratic quality of elections in new democracies. We may infer from the arguments by proponents of the PR vision that the effects are good. Minorities get a better representation reducing the incentives for anti-democratic behavior. Several parties by extension groups in society, have a say in the formulation of policies, which reduces probability for selective redistributive policies to be implemented (Weaver, 2002) . In sum, PR is thought to breed peaceful conflict resolution and consensus making in politics, which should be an asset in the context of a nascent unstable political democracy. Barkan (1998) for example, challenges this view asserting that the more agrarian the society, the higher the geographic concentration of the vote and the more closely will the distribution of seats under a majoritarian system be mirrored by the distribution through PR. He posits that voters evaluate party candidates on constituency service level rather than on national policies. Hence, party-list PR systems risk further alienation of citizens from both democracy and the state.
Mixed variants
Some authors (e.g. Weaver, 2002) ascribe particular alternatives such as the alternative vote (AV) used in the Australian House of Representatives, and the single transferable vote (STV) as mixed electoral systems. I generally prefer Sartori's (2001, p. 99) proposal to use to the label exclusively for electoral systems where both the voting method and the allocation of seats are in part majoritarian and in part proportional. Such systems, it has been argued, offer the best solution to satisfy the two main, though contrary imperatives of representative justice and governing capacity (Dunleavy and Margetts, 1995) . Empirical cases have been rare, however, although the African context now can increase that number with at least five countries.
Electoral systems in Africa: expected and empirical consequences
Africa represents a particularly interesting case of the relationship between the choice of electoral system and its effects for a number of reasons. First, contemporary Africa presents a new empirical field for the comparative study of constitutional engineering. 180 competitive elections have been held 1989-2001, of which 99 were parliamentary elections. Six countries conducted multiparty elections immediately prior to 1989 1 and continued in the 1990s. Including these elections, the total N is 116 cases of parliamentary elections.
2 Every individual poll has been given status as a case. Second, a wide range of electoral systems can be found in Africa today. Different majoritarian-and PR-systems as well as mixed ones have representation among the countries in Africa. Thus, the main thrust of the theoretical issues can be addressed. An overview of the countries using each system and some essential characteristics are found in Table 1 .
Third, conventional knowledge on electoral systems is based primarily on established democracies. Such a context presents both voters and leaders with an empirical reality distinct from that in Africa, which is likely to influence the consequences of electoral systems (Nohlen, 1996; Sartori, 2001) . Accordingly, one would expect electoral system effects to deviate from the conventional understanding. Hence, it seems that the comparative study of electoral systems should have something to learn from a regional study of Africa. 2 The data collection was cumbersome since no source could provide reliable and at the same time comprehensive data for all the 48 African states. Because of unreliability and unavailability of data, many sources were consulted. Data on each single election in every country was pooled by the author in country profile files. From that pooled file system, the data set was constructed. The data set is available at the author's website http://www.svet.lu.se/Staff/Personal_pages/Staffan_lindberg/Staffan_lindberg.html. The full documentation, coder's translation and references can be obtained from the author upon request. The sources used to pool this information were: Nohlen, Dieter, Michael Krennerich and Bernhard Thibaut, 1999 
Reliability
In this kind of research, the two principal threats to reliability are biases in the sources consulted and subjectivity in the coders' scoring. Contamination has been minimized by the use of multiple sources of information whenever possible. For less than 10% of the 116 cases of elections, there was only one source. For most of the others, three or more sources have been consulted. The net effect of the filtering should therefore be minimized. Fewer sources are typical for elections in the category of pre-1990 elections, yet these elections tend also to be less problematic to code and news-agencies archives have been very helpful in this regard. The effect of eventual errors has also been lessened by the use of ordinal rather than binary categories for each such indicator. Non-subjective indicators besides party composition and voter turnout are indeed rare (cf. Bollen, 1990) . However, even voter turnout figures are often loaded with measurement errors in Africa. Population figures are frequently rough estimates and voter's registries, if they exist, are often highly unreliable. The procedure was to pool the information obtained from all of the sources before making a judgment. Where sources disagreed, I was forced to use my own judgment to discriminate sometimes after consulting additional sources. This is a practice virtually inevitable in empirical research including research based on case studies (Bollen, 1990; Coppedge and Reinicke, 1990; Gasiororwski, 1996) . In line with the norms of social science data collection (King et al., 1994 ) the data set, coder's translations, and detailed background data files with full references to sources, have been made freely available for inspection.
Reductive effects
The first expected consequence regards the strength of the reductive effect. Majoritarian systems are expected to have a strong reductive effect whereas PR systems (to varying degree) are expected to have less. We distinguish here between the following systems (in rank order from strongest to least strong effect): plurality in single-member constituencies, absolute majority in single-, or multi-member constituencies, mixed systems, PR with small-to medium district magnitude, and PR with large district magnitude or pure PR. The reductive effect is measured by deducting the number of parties winning legislative seats from the total number of parties competing in the elections (Nohlen, 1996, p. 49) . That measure can be discussed, however. First, countries may have more or less parties campaigning than expected for reasons other than electoral systems. Hence, the reductive effect of a particular electoral system may vary significantly over cases. Second, and more damaging, one of the electoral systems in particular, is highly likely to reduce not only the number of parties gaining seats in the legislature but also the number of parties actually running for office. That is the plurality system. By its typical exclusionary logic, it is likely to reduce the number of parties before the actual campaign starts in almost any context. Bearing this in mind, this measure will be applied here simply to gauge the reductive effects and make the results compatible with established findings in comparative politics. A more valid measure would be to Table 2 .
3 It seems reasonable to assume that elections that are not free and fair will result in figures that are manufactured to some extent. Electoral fraud, voter intimidation, unfair campaigns and exclusionist policies will necessarily affect the number of parties participating, winning seats, voter turnouts and so on. Concordant to common sense, the reductive effect for unfair elections is substantially higher on average than for elections that are free and fair.
Free and fair elections, confirms the expected relationship between absolute majority-, mixed-and PR with large district magnitude or pure PR systems, thus the more proportional the electoral system the less reductive effect. We also find that the plurality system has a much lower reductive effect than the two-round absolute majority system and the more proportional PR system has a greater reductive effect that less pure PR. How do we explain this? Without a doubt, some countries have a particular number of parties for other reasons than electoral system. This is discussed in further detail below with regards to party systems.
Concerning the deviation by the plurality system we should recognize that this electoral system much more than the others, has consequences for how many parties that actually compete for seats. The exclusionary logic of the plurality system deters many would-be political entrepreneurs from running on their own party platforms. Most political entrepreneurs who wish to enter the game but find themselves likely to be the fourth, fifth or even sixth party, will presumably realize that the chances of winning are slim. A better strategy then is to join one of the existing parties. Especially if parties are not programmatic but clientilist in nature which tends to be the case in new democracies in Africa. In all other systems from absolute majority to pure PR a long list of parties can calculate to be better off on their own. In absolute majority systems political entrepreneurs can wisely run in the first round to be able to sell their support to any of the major contestants in the second round for the highest possible price. This seems as a particularly good strategy in clientistic systems where patronage or tribute determine the success or failure of political leaders. Similarly, actors in PR systems may hope for a seat in the legislative assembly only to offer their services to the highest bidder in case of an unclear legislative majority in parliament.
The theoretical expectation of reductive effects has implications for time-variation as well. In new democracies the differences between the electoral systems are likely to play out as the political players learn to know the incentives and pay-offs. Table 3 shows that all elections in countries that have performed at least three successive Note: The #parties participating and obtaining seats in parliament are only displayed for greater transparency. The reductive effect however, is calculated for each election separately and the geometric means are based on an analysis with elections as unit rather than the aggregated figures above. Note: All these countries have held at least three successive election without a breakdown of the electoral cycle because of a coup or similar events.
elections without interruption, are compared. The number of parties campaigning increases over time in most countries across electoral systems, even if the development is generally less pronounced in PR-systems. The reductive effect increases over time in five out of seven plurality-, and two out of three majoritarian systems but only in two out of five PR systems. The only two cases of decreasing reductive effect are found among PR systems. It seems that much of the expected logic of electoral systems with regards to the reductive effect over time plays out also in the empirical realities of Africa.
Party system effects
Second, we expect electoral systems to affect the party system indirectly via the reductive effect. We expect plurality in single-member districts to be associated with bi-party systems with an effective number of parties below 2.0. Absolute majority in single or multi-member districts typically displays more parties but only two major parties in the second round of voting. Hence, the effective number of parties in parliament is expected to be higher than for plurality systems but still close to 2.0. Mixed systems are expected to produce more effective number of legislative parties than majoritarian systems but less than variants of PR. PR with small-to medium district magnitude should be associated with above 2.5 effective number of parties in the legislature while we expect PR with large district magnitude or pure PR to draw an average above at least 3.0.
Africa presents a challenge for those interested in party systems. All but one of the categories of electoral systems have cases with extremely many parties running for seats of the legislature. The extreme par excellence is Madagascar operating a plurality system with 151 registered parties running in the last election while only nine won seats. Similarly, Cameroon using a two-round majority system had 45 parties registered and seven gained legislative shares; Senegal with her mixed system hit a record in the last election when 61 parties vied for votes and no less than 49 of them won at least one seat in the legislature, although forty of them are part of the loose coalition ('Sopi') supporting President Wade's Senegalese Democratic Party. Senegal's mixed system is also highly disproportional. The Sopi-coalition gained 63.8% of the legislative seats with only 49.6% of the votes after a campaign that was marked by civil violence. Among the countries with disproportional PR systems, Benin holds the top position with 35 registered parties running for the elections in 2001 and as many as twenty of those won legislative seats. Surprisingly, it is only among the more proportional PR systems in Africa that we find no such extreme cases. South Africa top the list with 16 registered parties and 13 in parliament.
It might seem to follow from the above discussion that the party system effects of institutional design in Africa are less than concordant to that in the established democracies and Latin America. One could think that it reminds more of some Eastern European countries, for example Poland where majoritarian design has not prevented a large number of parties from gaining seats in the upper chamber (Gebethner, 1996) . Note that in Table 4 the difference between unfair and free elections is replicated with regard to the number of effective parties. It is generally Note: The effective number of parties is calculated on the outcome of the last parliamentary election only for each country. For the other categories, the means are calculated on the total number of elections for each electoral system. much higher for free and fair elections, which makes perfect sense. The exception is plurality systems. This system seems to generate, or sustain, an essentially bipartisan system in either case. Of course, it is a strategic strength even for facade democracies to have at least a nominal opposition party with some legislative strength for reasons of international legitimacy. Looking at the free and fair elections, the general pattern seems to corroborate the view that electoral systems have similar consequences for the party system regardless of context. The more majoritarian and disproportional the electoral system, the fewer effective number of parties (given here, that the mixed systems like the ones in the Seychelles and Guinea, are in effect highly disproportional). The puzzle is the most proportional PR systems. In countries like South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, and Namibia the (close to) pure PR system generate, or at the minimum sustain, an essentially biparty system. This apparent paradox has been noted by several authors (e.g. Barkan, 1998; Bogaards, 2000) . Historical contingencies can do a long way to explain this situation. All have a history of an entrenched conflict line between two main contenders in national politics. In several of these countries, it has led to extended civil wars between two rival armies. It is no wonder that such a trajectory leads to a electoral competition along the same lines despite, and not thanks to, relatively pure PR systems. Nevertheless, in the longer run a PR system might make it easier to break up these dangerous, previously highly deadly lines of division.
Governing capacity
Plurality in single-member constituencies and majority in single-, or multi-member constituencies, are thought to be associated with substantial legislative majorities implying a high governing capacity. Mixed systems may or may not produce clear legislative majorities. Yet, PR with small-to medium district magnitude, and to a greater extent PR with large district magnitude or pure PR, are typically expected to conjure with unclear and/or weak legislative majorities. I suggest measuring governing capacity directly by the strength of legislative majorities using two indicators: winning party's share of legislative seats and second party's share of the same. Note that with regard to the former, I measured only the largest party's seat shares and not winning coalitions. The measurement of the next largest party is to indicate the strength of the major opposition party in the legislature.
Governing capacity as discussed in the literature on institutional design in general and on electoral systems in particular translates into legislative majority. While an absolute majority in parliament for the governing party is then generating a secure governing capacity, a qualified majority (required for making constitutional changes unilaterally, typically a two-thirds majority) is often conceived to err on too much governing capacity. The dominant one-party system is not necessarily producing bad governments but arguably increases the risk of negligence of minority rights, lack of transparency and accountability, nepotism and other forms of abuse of power.
With regard to the empirical realities in Africa, the results in Table 4 once more display a substantial difference between unfair and free elections. The relative shares of legislative seats won by the largest party are substantially lower in free than in unfair elections. Electoral manipulation has many faces (Schedler, 2002) with obvious implications for the distribution of legislative power. As for the consequences of electoral systems in free and fair elections, it seems to be that these are much the same in Africa as elsewhere in the world. The more majoritarian the electoral system, the more substantial legislative majorities. The exception again is the relatively pure PR, which for the reasons mentioned above have biparty systems and hence are associated with high governing capacity. However, it seems that the plurality system tends to lead to a bit of an 'overkill' capacity, which threatens the competition often necessary for the democratic values of transparency, ex post uncertainty, accountability and power of the people to decide who will represent them. We find examples of one-party dominance in several of the categories but it is among countries with a plurality system that this seems to be a norm induced by the electoral system. In line with the expectations based on studies of the established democracies the other category of PR system, despite the majoritarian effect of small constituencies, typically produce coalition or minority support for the government. This is not necessarily a problem, however. It can be argued on basis of empirical data that such governments perform as well, or even better, in terms of stability and policy outcome as do single-party majority governments. At least as long as coalitions include no more than three to five parties (Sartori, 1997, p. 60) .
Fairness of elections
A discussion specific for new democracies may offer some insight into issues of participation and accountability given the frequent incidence of 'unfree' elections in Africa. 'Unfairness' of elections, contaminates data on popular participation and accountability to the extent of rendering analysis meaningless, that is unless we control for it in the analysis. That is the methodological point. Theoretically, the proponents of the proportional vision posit that these systems are better serving the democratic quality in plural societies, as it were, than majoritarian systems. Hence, the democratic quality of elections will be evaluated, using here two essential indicators: the free and fairness of elections and whether the electoral process was peaceful or not. The identification of the former builds primarily on international and domestic election monitoring assessments. The application of peacefulness used here is very strict. Only elections where there have been no reports of elections-related violence during the campaign and election day are designated as peaceful.
The consequences of electoral systems on participation, accountability and democratic quality of elections in Africa are reported in Table 5 . Generally, PR systems have produced elections of significantly higher levels of fairness than have majoritarian systems, with mixed variants somewhere in between. That is the general picture. PR systems are associated with higher shares of free and fair elections with pure (sic) PR of outstanding performance. Fairness is lowest by all means in absolute majority systems where only 30% of all elections were deemed free and fair even by the relatively low international standards, and of those free and fair elections only 17% were completely peaceful. Higher shares of completely peaceful processes are associated primarily with mixed systems, and secondly with plurality systems.
Overall, the number of free and fair elections in Africa has been too low to meet the expectations raised in the early 1990s of a new democratic era for African politics. The two most successful and oldest democracies in the region, Botswana and Mauritius, both have plurality systems and are parliamentary democracies. There are more recent, relatively successful cases. Ghana operates a plurality system, while Mali and Gabon use the absolute majority system (Gabon changed from PR to absolute majority system only in 1996). Benin, Cape Verde and Senegal use PR in small MMC's while South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique all have relatively pure PR systems. Among all these recent cases all but South Africa are presidential rather than parliamentary regimes.
Participation in elections
The more majoritarian the system the lower the level of participation, following current wisdom. A plurality system with its exclusionary logic towards peripheral voting subjects and typical competition for the median voter is assumed to lead to lower voter turnout. We may also assume that in new democracies parties that stand little chance of winning (in plurality systems -small parties with medium or low geographical concentration of voters) may just exit. Hence we can assume that the more multipolar the competition and lower effective thresholds typical for proportional systems the higher participation both by voters and marginal parties.
First, Table 5 reveals another interesting finding. What President Mobutu and others once did in terms of real or fake high turnouts to acclaim legitimacy is not so common anymore. One suspects more assertive opposition forces and greater international involvement in electoral administration have made it harder for incumbents to manipulate turnout figures than before. In any case, flawed elections are no longer associated with inflated voter turnout figures in Africa. To the contrary, unfair elections draw fewer voters than democratic ones. The peoples of Africa knows a fraudulent elections when they see one coming and chose abstain to a greater degree when their vote is not likely to make a difference.
In Table 5 , the absolute majority system is a rather startling case of popular participation. A close look at the democratic quality of the elections in question might shed some light on this paradox. Over two-thirds of all elections in these countries have been non-democratic, 'plebiscitory' events in which the elite reproduced itself. Consequently, few opposition parties wish to participate (in unfree elections) and voters do not bother to go to the polling booth. When this is the rule and the exception of a more fair election actually comes around, people are naturally still skeptical. That would explain why figures of participation are not higher in this category even for free and fair elections. Countries in this category include the wellknown disgraceful cases of efforts to democratize like Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Comoros, Mauritania, and Togo. 
Accountability
Electoral systems are also expected to perform differently with regard to accountability. The two main versions of the majoritarian vision supposedly present voters with a clear picture of responsibility, making policy accountability obvious. Hence, the expectation for a higher degree of electoral turnovers (shifting majorities) in the legislature. Mixed systems again are somewhere in between whereas in PR with small-to medium district magnitude, and to a greater extent, in PR with large district magnitude or pure PR, holding individual parties accountable for policy decisions is even harder. Shifting majorities are supposed to be less frequent and a collaborative pooling between the new coalitions from the old ruling coalition and former opposition. To gauge these we would need data on government performance and voters' perceptions of that performance to use as controls. These data are not available. Yet, it is an improvement to our knowledge to do with what we have, rather than abstain from any inquiry at all even if it means that our results must be preliminary. The indicator we use is legislative turnovers, or shifting majorities. Hence, the interpretation should be cautioned. The difference between PR and mixed systems on the one hand, and majoritarian systems on the other, is so marked that it cannot be neglected because it runs contrary to expectations. Accountability is supposed to be one of the main strengths of majoritarian systems. With the measure used here it seems that plurality systems in particular perform poorly indeed. The incidence of legislative turnover is about three times more common in PR and mixed systems than in majoritarian systems. At least two distinct inferences are possible from this. Either turnover is not at all connected to accountability, hence, we still do not know the empirical realities in Africa, or, majoritarian systems do not come out strong on accountability in the context of socio-political realities in Africa. The present study cannot give an answer but recommends that further research is done with regard to the performance of different electoral systems on accountability in Africa.
Discussion
These interesting similarities and differences across countries with different historical backgrounds add some new considerations. Africa provides a large number of new cases and political outcomes in a field of study long dominated if not defined, by European experiences. Changes in electoral systems alone are not likely to have exactly the same significant effects on political behavior in Africa in established democracies. There can be no denying that a distinct colonial experience combined with extremely low per capita income, and an agrarian existence differentiates Africa from the rest of the world. In addition, an eclectic ethnic population, a particular fusion of political and economic power, high levels of external debt and dependency, and the prevalence of neopatrimonial politics, are some of the other characteristics that further distinguishes Africa (Barkan, 2000, pp. 228-230 ). Yet, the introductory pages of a recent analysis of institutional design and democratization seem to suggest that Africa is not altogether different. Some common denominators for the countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe are said to be: ''[.] the transition is hampered in most of these countries by cultural factors and in all of them by economic ones. Many of the democratizing societies have weak democratic traditions [.] and thus the legitimacy of the new political institutions is fragile [.] and much of society still has a communitarian, anticapitalist mentality. Above all, economic conditions are not very favorable [.] most of these countries also bear the burden of large foreign debts.'' (Lijphart and Waisman, 1996, pp. 2-3) Some Africanists argue that majoritarian systems feed the 'big man' syndrome and reduce the likelihood of democracy by encouraging a zero-sum approach to political action. People continue to vote based on their residence rather than policy preferences. Barkan (1995) argues that the more agrarian the society, the higher the geographic concentration of the vote. This finding led Barkan to advocate that a proportional system of representation does not really make much difference in agrarian societies and that a single-member district plurality system is equally good in ensuring a distribution of seats in parliament that reflects the total vote. Furthermore, voters choose representatives based on how good they are as patrons of their respective community or constituency (Chabal, 1986) . Based on a recent field experiment, Wantchekron (2003) has been able to estimate the real effect of patronage platforms for voting behavior. Yet, it is not clear how much this preference for patron over policy at the constituency level is part of a parochial political culture in which dependency on some one with the right political connections is prevalent (Almond and Verba, 1963) . Regardless of cause, however, it provides an electoral logic that differs from other places where elections are primarily fought over choices of policy. A recent study of parliamentary election campaigns by Lindberg (2003) has shown that this pattern is reinforced by successive multiparty elections, which poses several challenges to the functioning of polyarchy. The most notable effect is the proliferation of political parties and the problem of uniting the opposition in fighting the government party in elections. Each geographical community is treated as an independent base, where politicians compete for a single seat with little or no regard for what is happening in other constituencies or at the national level.
Instead of providing increased political stability and less conflict by generating fewer political parties, majoritarian systems give rise to a polarized situation. A single party typically obtains a majority exceeding two thirds of all seats. The opposition is often split on a large number of small parties that compete for votes and make political compromise and accommodation in the policy process difficult. The PR-systems, on the other hand, produce fewer parties while at the same time giving the opposition a more substantial voice in the House, thus encouraging cooperation and coalition building. This finding is not surprising for those who have studied African politics. The anomaly can be explained by the continued presence of 'big man' politics, in which control of resources for patronage is imperative. Clients will choose representatives that are most likely to have such control hence, a tendency to prefer an incumbent that has proved his ability to 'deliver'. Preference for an alternative will be greatest in those constituencies where elected representatives have not lived up to client expectations. They would go for a new representative and this person would be chosen based on his personal qualities rather than which party he belongs to. What effects this kind of politics will have and whether the continued use of a particular electoral system will, as suggested by studies from other regions of the world, have the effect of modifying behavior and choice in predictable ways, are issues that deserve more attention. This study can only provide what are best conceived of as preliminary findings.
To the extent that the electoral system is an important variable with particular effects in Africa, it is probably in relation to reining the detrimental effects of neopatrimonialism. PR types of electoral system are likely to be more effective in this regard than their majoritarian counterparts. Similarly, how boundaries of electoral districts are being drawn may also be significant in terms of influencing political behavior among those seeking office. Given the inconclusive evidence regarding the effects of particular types of electoral system on the number of political parties, I am inclined to recommend further studies to determine how and to what extent electoral system affects political outcomes in Africa.
Preliminary conclusions
In many respects, electoral systems have similar effects to the ones reported for the established democracies and countries in Latin America. Overall, PR systems are doing a better job than majoritarian systems not only in representativity, accountability and 'democraticness' of elections but also on governing capacity. It is with regard to the latter that Africa distinguishes from established democracies.
Moreover, the socio-political background is different in Africa and neopatrimonialism remains an issue of singular importance to political development. In this regard, majoritarian systems seem less conducive for stability and peaceful coexistence in the longer run. There are preliminary findings, however. First, multiparty elections in African countries, save a few, are recent phenomena and the N is comparatively low to begin with. The consequences of electoral systems as devices of constitutional engineering may not have shown yet, at least to their full effect. Moreover, the party systems are probably not settled yet, in the sense that Sartori (2001) frame as 'structured'. The prevailing parochial political culture induces emphasis on person rather than party -hence the prevalent tendency in African countries for political parties to be one-person operations. These are not 'effective' parties as they are regarded in institutionalized democracies (cf. Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) , but they are 'real' parties in the sense that they are the product of rational choices by political actors. Third, the analysis presented here includes no controls apart from the denomination of elections as either free and fair or not. Ultimately, controls should be introduced at least for socio-economic development, types of state and constitutional regime, corruption and the extension of mass media.
It is therefore worth noting, that many of the general consequences found in more developed democracies where the electoral system, as Sartori (1968, p. 273) has argued is 'the most manipulative instrument of politics', are replicated also in Africa at this early stage of democratization. In particular, the main finding is that the advocates of proportional systems for divided societies such as Lijphart and Reynolds, gain support from the factual evidence reported here. The more specific finding that systems of proportional representation are more likely than majority or plurality systems to encourage a greater number of opposition parties and reward them with a larger share of all seats also holds in this study of African elections. This finding notwithstanding, Africa in some other respects present a challenge to the conventional wisdom about the effects of particular types of electoral systems.
